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POINT X. 
CONCLUSION. 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOUTH SALT LAKE 
ORDINANCES ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT. 
INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS OF THE ACT REMAIN 
IN EFFECT EVEN THOUGH OTHERS MAY BE 
DEEMED INVALID. • • • • • • 
iii 
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exercise powers _not delegated.to them by the state 
or its Constitution. Each Justice soundly and 
fundamentally said that the subject Ordinance 
(32-1-1) was an attempt to exercise a power not 
so delegated. At 439. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that §10-8-84 does 
indeed g~ve additional wide powers to the city to do such 
things as "are necessary and prop-er. to provide for. the safety 
and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort and convenience of the City and the 
inhabitants t_hereof, " We are still back where we started. 
This is still not an ordinance necessary OJ; proper in the 
fight against prostitution~ It does not deal with prostitu-
tion directly,_ but deals with it in an indirect manner, which. 
the Court, in Jensen, clearly said cannot be done. This case 
is not ·analogous to the Allred case, where simply another 
aspect of the prost;:itution :business was prohibited. 
·A case involving many of the same issues as are present 
here was before this Court in the case of Salt Lake City vs. 
Revene, 124 P2d 537 (Utah 1942). In that case, the Defendant 
was charged.with theviolation of a city ordit).ance.regulating 
the hours in which a barbershop could ·remain open. Defendant 
demurred to the charge, and both the trial court and Supreme 
Court sustained that demurrer. The city .argued that the 
regulation of hours of the business was "valid under the police 
power granted it by the legislature by §15-8-39, 15-8-84, and 
15-8-61 ... "at 538. The statutes cited, under the code of 
1933, were the same statutes now designated as §10-8-39, 10-8-84, 
-19-
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and 10-8-61. Section 10-8-39 is the general licens.e and tax-
ing authority, and 10~8-61 allows the city to make regulations 
to "prevent the introduction of contagious, infectious or malig 
nant diseases into the City. " Section 10-8-84, of course, 
is the general statement which has been previously discussed. 
The Court unanimously turned down the city'~ position, which 
the Court characterized as follows: 
It is Plaintiff's position that the above ordinance 
regulating the hours of a barber shop is a valid 
exercise of the police power delegated by the leg-
islature to the city to ''regulate" for the safety 
and preservation of health of the community. The 
Plai~tiff introduced evidence taken at a previous 
time in the form of testimony by barbers and health 
officials to the effect that a "tired barber was a 
negligent barber", tending to afford an opportunity 
for the spread of diseases associated with the 
profession. Further, that from an administrative 
standpoint it was impossible to inspect the barber 
shop after 6 o'clock P.M. at 538. 
The Court then discussed this contention, as follows: 
It has been repeatedly stated by 1;his Court "That a 
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise 
the following powers, and no others: First, those 
granted in express words; second, those necessary 
or fairly implied in or incident to the powers 
expressly granted; third, those essential to the 
accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes 
of the corporation, -- not simply convenient but 
indispensable." (citations omitted) at 538. 
The rule making power given to cities in reference 
to barber shops does not mean any rule but such 
rules reasonably related and designed to protect 
the health of the public. at 539. 
A tired barber may be a careless barber but it 
does not follow that all shops which remain open 
more than a certain number of hours engage the 
same barbers throughout the entire period. Barbers 
can work in shifts. If the object of the law was 
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lt is appropriate here to refer to the case of rn· ~ Lane, 
372 P2d.897 (Calif 1962) in which the Court stated as follows: 
Defendant was convicted of the crime of "resorting," 
after a court trial in the Municipal Court for the 
Los Angeles Judicial District on two charges of 
violating §51.07 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, 
which provides: "No person shall resort to any 
off ice building or to any room used or occupied 
in connection with, or under the same management 
and any cafe, restaurant, soft drink parlor, liquor 
establishment, or similar businesses, or to any 
public park or to any of the buildings therein or 
to any vacant lot, room rooming house, lodging 
house, residence, apartment house, hotel, house 
trailer, street or sidewalk for the purpose of 
having sexual intercourse with a person to whom 
he or she is not married, or for the purpose of 
performing or participating in any lewd act with 
any such person. At 898. 
The court, on page 899 of the decision lists numerous 
acts of sexual intercourse which_have been made illegal by the 
state, and then goes on to list lewd acts in public places, 
crimes against children, indecent exposure, obscene exhibitions 
and acts against public decency as being outlawed by the state 
of California. Defendant was accused of going from her own 
living room to her own bedroom "for the purpose of having 
sexual interc;:ourse with a male to whom she was not married." 
(At 898) The court stated: 
Although living in a state of cohabitation and 
a_dultery is prohibited, neither simple fornication 
or adultery alone nor living in a state of cohabitation 
and fornication has been made a crime in this state. 
(citations omitted.) 
Accordingly, a city ordinance attempting to make 
sexual intercourse between persons not married to 
each other criminal is in conflict with the state 
law and is void. At 900. 
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DECISION RENDERED BY THIS COURT. 
Article VIII, §2 of The Constitution of Utah states 
as follows: 
The Supreme Court shall consist of five 
Judges, which number may be increased or 
decreased by the legislature, but no 
alteration or increase shall have the 
effect of removing a Judge from office. 
A majority of the Judges constituting the 
Court shall be necessary to form a quorum 
or render a disposition. If a Justice of 
the Supreme Court shall be disqualified 
from sitting in a cause before said Court, 
the remaining Judges shall call a District 
Judge to sit with them on the hearing of 
such cause. 
Oral argument on the merits of this case took place on 
November 10, 1980, with Chief Justice Crockett presiding, 
accompanied by Justices Stewart, Hall and Wilkinson. As 
Justice Maughan was ill, his place was taken by Kenneth 
Rigtrup, Judge of the Third Judicial District. Justice 
Wilkins resigned from the Court effective November 30, 1980 
and Chief Justice Crockett's term ended at the end of 
December, 1980. Neither of these Justices participated in 
the decision. The decision was rendered by two regular 
members of the Supreme Court and one District Court Judge. 
Likewise, the companion case of Redwood GYII! v Salt Lake County 
Commission, decided the same day and upon part of which the 
decision in the instant case was based, was decided by two 
regular members of this Court and one District Judge. While 
it appears that the Constitution gives this Court authority 
to make the decision as it did, the issues at hand call for 
-5-
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POINT IV 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW SUPPORT APPELLANTS' POSITION 
THAT §3B-8-5(1) OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SOUTH SALT LAKE 
IS INVALID. 
The most recent State Supreme case previously cited 
by appellants regarding the validity of opposite sex massage 
ordinances was City and County ·of D'enver v Nielson, 572 
P.2d 484 (Col. 1977). In Respondents' Memorandum, which 
due to circumstances appellants had no opportunity to 
respond to, the case of City of Indianapoti·s v Wright, 
371 N.E.2d 1298 (Ind. 1978) was cited. Respondents cited 
that case as another example where the constitutional 
arguments of denial of equal protection or due process 
were made by plaintiffs in a massage case, and went 
unheeded by both state and federal courts. Respondents, 
however, failed to notice a most important part of the 
holding rendered by that court. A lower court had inval-
idated the law by determining that the massage ordinance 
was an attempted local law in an area preempted by state 
law. The trial court so held, on the assumption that a 
violation of the prohibition on massaging a member of the 
opposite sex or touching of a patrons genitals was a crim-
inal offense, punishable by the "general penalties" 
provision of the Indiana code, as a misdemeanor. The 
Indiana State Code provides a specific misdemeanor penalty 
-8-
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l S. B. No. 26 
2 required for the takinq of any action under the Utah Medical 
3 Practice Act. 
4 ( 10) ·For practitioners in the treatment of human ailments 
5 in accordance with the tenets of a professional schoolr 
6 colleqe, or institution, recognized by the department of 
7 reqistration, of which the applicant is a qraduate as 
8 designated in his application for a license, includinq the 
9 practice of obstetrics with the use of drugs or medicine, but 
10 without operative surgery, except operative minor surgery, a 
11 committee of five members to be desiqnated by the director. 
12 Notwithstanding the provisions of section 58-1-6, one member 
13 shall be licensed to practice medicine and surqery in all 
14 branches, two members shall be practitioners of naturopathy 
15 licensed to practice the treatment of human ailments without 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
the use of druqs or medicine and without operative surgery, one 
member shall be a citizen who is not licensed in any healinq 
art and one member shall be on the staff of the university of 
Utah medical school. 
(11) For practitioners of naturopathy, a committee of 
three members, each of whom shall be a graduate of a school of 
naturopathy of standing recognized by the department of 
registration. 
(12) For practi~ioners of physical therapy, a committee 
of three members, each of whom shall be a licensed practitioner 
of physical therapy in this state and a graduate of an approved 
school of physical therapy. 
(13) For osteopathic physicians and surgeons, a committee 
of three members each of whom shall be a graduate of a 
chartered college of osteopathy of recognized standing. 
(14) For optometrists, a committee of three licensed 
optometrists. 
(15) For pharmacists, a committee of five pharmacists to 
be designated as Utah state board of pharmacy. 
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